Tag Archives: german idealism

hegel and nothing

Pure being is so indeterminate that it is not even being and so is nothing. This is one gloss on the basic Hegelian idea at the beginning of the Science of Logic. But what does it mean? To achieve a correct … Continue reading

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meillassoux versus schelling

I recently took the time to read Schelling’s Grounding of the Positive Philosophy, and got to thinking about how it compares with Meillassoux’s project. As Markus Gabriel observes, there is definitely an onto-theological tendency in Schelling as in Fichte and Hegel, … Continue reading

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new meillassoux book

An expanded version of Meillassoux’s 2012 Berlin lecture appears to be forthcoming in book form.  

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monism and the psr

Rebecca Goldstein gives us a particularly nice, brief portrait of Spinoza’s basic cast of mind, one dominated by the centrality of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) to his philosophical system and its isotropic zest for unification. On Goldstein’s reading, … Continue reading

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three types of certainty

Whatever exactly certainty amounts to, we can think about it using the framework of possible worlds. To begin with, as typically understood, ¬p is epistemically (rather than metaphysically) possible for me iff I do not know that p. Is this the sort of possibility that we should … Continue reading

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kant, spinoza, and a little hume

One of the virtues of Paul W. Franks book All or Nothing is that it explores the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of the Agrippan trilemma at the same time. To escape the latter for a series X – supposing we accept the need to … Continue reading

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kant and receptivity

A key disagreement between Kant and Leibniz regards whether it is possible to know things as they are in themselves via the senses. Both agree (verbally at least) that knowledge comes through or requires the participation of the senses, but Kant takes … Continue reading

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