**Characterising the PSR**

For Meillassoux the **PSR** is a philosophical fifth postulate. According to this principle (2008: 33), for “every thing, every fact, and every occurrence, there must be a reason why it is thus and so rather than otherwise.” Meillassoux implicitly equates the **PSR** with the view that “*every *entity is absolutely necessary” (ibid). It is an interesting question whether he would also accept the equation of the **PSR** with necessitarianism, the view that every *truth *is absolutely necessary. I don’t think it matters for present purposes. In any case, let’s add a bit more detail to what the **PSR** says before we continue.

A proposition *p *lacks sufficient reason if it is “essentially not deducible” (2011: 181). Thus we can think of sufficiency in terms of deducibility, and hence the elimination of possibilities: a reason *q *for *p** *is sufficient *only if *it excludes all possibilities incompatible with *p. *Finally, a reason *q *cannot be its own sufficient reason if it is a contingent truth. Given this traditional understanding of the **PSR**, which I shall call “Spinozist”, there is a straightforward incompatibility between sufficient reasons and contingency: if *p *is contingently false in the actual world **W**, then there is no *q *sufficient for *p* in **W**. So, for any *q *that *would* entail *p, **q *is either necessarily false (and hence the **PSR** false since this precludes a sufficient reason for *p*), or contingently true, in which case the algorithm iterates. Result: the set of all such truths produced by this regress is either contingently true (in which case it cannot be its own sufficient reason), or necessarily true (in which case everything deducible from it is also necessarily true). Either the **PSR** is false or there is no contingency.

**Meillassoux’s project and its (contingent?) incompleteness**

Meillassoux’s project is to carry out an “adventure” analogous to that of non-Euclidean geometry, this time within philosophy (2008: 92). But whereas Lobachevsky developed his hyperbolic geometry without first trying to demonstrate that the fifth postulate was false (i.e. without trying to demonstrate the consistency of Euclidean geometry with its negation), Meillassoux believes he *can *demonstrate that the **PSR** is false. Nevertheless, Meillassoux acknowledges that his project is incomplete in its present form. This acknowledgement comes in his discussion of the competing axiomatisations of set theory, which I do not discuss here. This is one sense in which *After Finitude *is, as Badiou says, a “fragment” of a larger philosophical enterprise. There is a second sense, however. Meillassoux wants to prove what he calls the “principle of factiality” or “unreason”, i.e. the falsity of the **PSR **and consequent reality of contingency. But what we are given in *After Finitude *is only a *part *of this proof. Whether it is the most important part or not is a moot point, since what is left out is also unquestionably important: namely a proper confrontation with Hegel and the subjectalists, who hold that some correlate necessarily exists. Instead Meillassoux joins a long line of continental anti-Hegelians who postpone confronting Hegel in print, sometimes indefinitely.

**Correlationism**

Correlationism is a hybrid of scepticism and relativism. Scepticism to look *away* from **x** and relativism to look *towards* **y**. (This is to be contrasted with non-sceptical fallibilism, where we keep looking towards **x**, only *less assuredly*.) According to the correlationist, the intrinsic properties of things cannot be distinguished from artefacts of our particular subjective mode of access to them. Meillassoux quotes Wolff’s gnomic expression of correlationism (2008: 6):

We are in consciousness or language as in a transparent cage. Everything is outside, yet it is impossible to get out.

The basic correlationist move is something like this: human knowledge is receptive, passive, finite etc., *hence *we are ignorant of how things are like independently of our access to them. If this is true then we can reason as follows: since the in-itself provides the sufficient reason of the given, it follows that the latter, like the former, is inaccessible. The reason may *be* there, but we can’t *know* it. This is what Meillassoux calls “facticity” (2008: 41). Meillassoux wants to reveal facticity as absolute, i.e. as factiality or real contingency. He claims to have a *proof *of factiality, but what does he mean by this?

**A proof? The revenge of incompleteness**

Meillassoux describes his proof as indirect and refutational, yet ecumenical and absolute (2008: 61, my italics):

One establishes the principle [of factiality] without deducing it, by demonstrating thatanyonewho contests it can do so only by presupposing it to be true, thereby refuting him or herself.

How seriously should we read “anyone” in this passage? Well, the way Meillassoux proceeds presupposes that self-refutation is unacceptable – thus *radical* sceptics are excluded straightaway. But never mind – the real question is whether *all* non-sceptical inquirers are subject to Meillassoux’s dictate here.

To illustrate what may be problematic about this, allow me to briefly contrast two understandings of facticity: *minimal* and *substantive*. The former corresponds to *doubt per se,* and the latter to anything beyond this.* *Plausibly there is a connection between the former and the correlationist themes of passivity, receptivity, and finitude: only we finite, non-divine underlings doubt. If *that* is enough for factiality then we can stop right here – our work is done. Whether right or wrong, I do think that this way of reading Meillassoux is heuristically productive. It casts light on aspects of his position that otherwise seem arbitrary, in particular the sheer reductiveness of grouping Berkeley, Hegel, Nietzsche, Deleuze and others together as members of the same philosophical family (namely subjectalism). Each of these thinkers denies the inference from doubt to brute contingency.

Of course we are tempted to add: *rightly *denies this inference, since (according to this temptation) it deserves little more than an incredulous stare. Surely minimal facticity is not enough to establish the falsity of the **PSR**! Indeed, it is typically thought to be insufficient even for establishing correlationism. *Prima facie, *only the most radical subjectivist could potentially encounter difficulty in accommodating minimal facticity in her worldview. At any rate, to show that e.g. Hegel suffers from the same difficulty would be just as hard as showing that his position collapses into radical subjectivism.

More seriously, I suspect that, not only is it just as hard to

(**a**) show that commitment to minimal facticity leads (without further commitment) to factiality

as to

(**b**) convince Hegel to accept premises stronger than minimal facticity*;

but, in addition to this, it is also the case that (a) is impossible, or at least not finitely tractable. Again, what I am suggesting is that if we make the *premises *of Meillassoux’s proof weak and thus hard to deny, then the validity of the proof becomes dubious. On the other hand, if we make the premises strong so as to secure validity, they become easier to deny. My current hypothesis is that between Meillassoux’s conclusion and its negation there is a stubborn *undecidability*: there is no valid argument with premises that cannot be denied on pain of self-refutation by *anyone *(who accepts that self-refutation should be avoided).* *That is, Meillassoux’s project is not merely contingently but necessarily incomplete: the subjectalist wiggles free.

If I am wrong about this then the correlationist must have an argument against the subjectalist that is anhypothetical. What might this argument be? I explore this question in my next post.

*If you think this is accomplished *via *the so-called *paradox of absolute knowledge,* I’d be interested to hear why.

**References**

- Quentin Meillassoux,
*After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency,*trans. Ray Brassier, (Continuum: 2008). - Graham Harman,
*Quentin Meillassoux: Philosophy in the Making,*(Edinburgh University Press: 2011).

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I found it contentious that Meillassoux took as his contradictory entity (in his deduction of establishment of non-contradiction) the one which was maximally contradictory, the one which for each of it’s predicates the negated predicate also held, rather than simply the entity which had at least one predicate whose negated predicate also held. Along these lines, I feel as though he a poor treatment of the objection from paraconsistency or dialethism. It’s not enough that paraconsistency developed within the context of expert medical systems to show that paraconsistency couldn’t apply to ontological or real contradiction. The origin of a system or modality of thought doesn’t circumscribe or limit its eventual possibilities of application. He himself believes that mathematization is not merely a form of epistemic register, not merely a correlate that obtains for-us; then he should accept that mathematization about contradiction could, at least in principle, point to ontological contradiction. How do you feel about this?

Thank you very much for your comment.

I completely agree that it’s contentious for Meillassoux to assume ex falso, i.e. the interchangeability of contradictory and trivial beings, given his pretensions to anhypotheticity. However I am in two minds about Meillassoux’s intentions regarding the latter. Although an association of anhypotheticity with apodicticity/certainty is suggested in his work, it’s also conceivable that he means nothing more than to offer a novel defense of the traditional view that denying the principle of non-contradiction is self-refuting. Certainly there is in Meillassoux’s thought a blend of radical posturing and naive rationalism that is unhappily reminiscent of Descartes and the Cartesian Circle. This at any rate is the line of thought I develop in my unpublished paper, which I hope to present at a conference soon.

Sorry for ignoring this for so long. Could you email your paper to divisionbyz3r0 AT gmail DOT com. I would like to have a look at it if you don’t mind

No worries.