Even when successively thought of as distinct from the possible, absolutely real, completely determined and and as a strict part of the actual object, the virtual cannot, qua ground, accord with the univocity of the Being-One. The more Deleuze attempts to wrest the virtual from irreality, indetermination, and nonobjectivity, the more irreal, indetermined, and finally nonobjective the actual (or beings) becomes, because it phantasmically splits into two. In this circuit of thought, it is the Two and not the One that is instated. And when the only way of saving – despite everything – the One, is by resorting to an unthinkable Two, an indiscernibility beyond remedy, and the use of the reconciling and obscure metaphor of the “mutual image,” one says to oneself that, decidedly, the virtual is no better than the finality of which it is the inversion (it determines the destiny of everything, instead of being that to which everything is destined). Let us be particularly harsh and invoke Spinoza against his major, and indeed sole, truly modern disciple: just like finality, the virtual is ignorantiae asylum.
Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, p. 53.